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Across Protocol Domain Hijack Explained: How a Namecheap Attack Drained an Estimated $402,000 Without Touching a Smart Contract

Across Protocol Domain Hijack Explained: How a Namecheap Attack Drained an Estimated $402,000 Without Touching a Smart Contract

Across Protocol Domain Hijack Explained: How a Namecheap Attack Drained an Estimated $402,000 Without Touching a Smart Contract

Wallet • November 18, 2026

By Priyo Harjiyono

TL;DR: On November 10, 2026, an attacker took control of across.to, the website of the bridge Across Protocol, through a social engineering attack on its registrar, Namecheap. For about three hours, the real address served a fake app that asked visitors to sign token approvals, letting a rented wallet drainer empty their wallets. Bitquery traced about $401,900 taken from nine wallets on five chains and calls that a floor. Across has given no loss total. No smart contract was exploited. If you signed anything that night, check your approvals on every chain and revoke anything pointing at the attacker contracts below.

Last updated: November 2026

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The attack hit the domain, not the protocol. Whoever controls the registrar record decides which website your browser loads.
  • Bitquery estimates $401,900 drained from nine wallets, one Aave depositor accounting for about 76%. GoPlus put it near $350,000. Across confirmed neither.
  • The fake site asked for ordinary approvals and permits. The signatures looked normal, so reading what you sign matters more than checking the URL.
  • Across regained the domain by 01:16 UTC on November 11, but the promised post-mortem was still unpublished as of November 18, 2026.
  • Approvals stay open until revoked. Revoke first, then consider moving funds to a fresh wallet, since an unused permit leaves no trace.

Every security guide in crypto says the same thing: check the URL before you connect your wallet. On the evening of November 10, 2026, that advice failed. The URL was correct. The page behind it was not. Across Protocol, one of the busiest bridges in crypto with about $5.9 billion in 30-day transfer volume per DefiLlama data cited by Cointelegraph, lost control of its web address to an attacker who pointed it at a copy of the app.

What Happened: Hour by Hour

All times are UTC. The timeline comes from Across's posts on X and Cointelegraph's reporting, as reconstructed by Coindaro.

Time (UTC) What happened Source
Tue 10 Nov, about 18:45 An attacker gains control of across.to through social engineering at Namecheap, Across's registrar. Across on X
Within 15 minutes Across says it was alerted and started working to take the fake site down. Across on X
About 19:05 Across warns: "Do NOT visit the app, connect your wallet, or sign any transaction or approval there until further notice." Across on X, quoted by DeFi Prime
19:02-21:53 Bitquery traces drains from nine wallets on five chains, the first on Arbitrum about 18 minutes after the takeover. Bitquery
Tue evening SEAL911 flags across.to as phishing; Cloudflare pulls its DNS records, taking the fake app offline. Across on X; Cointelegraph
22:13 Across describes the takeover, says Namecheap has been unresponsive, and keeps its front end and API offline. Across on X
Tue night Across promises affected users will be made whole and publishes a recovery guide listing the attacker contracts to revoke. Across on X; recovery guide
Wed 11 Nov, 01:16 Domain back under Across's control; all systems normal. Across thanks Namecheap's founder for helping secure the account. Across on X; Cointelegraph

Across initially called it a "potential security incident" without saying the site had been taken, Cointelegraph reported. At 22:13 UTC the team confirmed the takeover and wrote that its domain "was fully locked down with best-in-class security practices; this unauthorized takeover should not have been possible."

A Domain Hijack Is Not a Smart Contract Exploit

Most crypto thefts follow two scripts: a bug in a smart contract, or a stolen private key. This was neither, and the defenses are different too. A domain name is rented. A project pays a registrar, here Namecheap, to hold its name and the record saying which server the name points to. Whoever controls that account can change the record, and everyone who types the name lands on a different server, while the address bar still shows the real name.

Across's contracts kept running normally; they were never touched. The theft happened one layer up: the website visitors used to reach those contracts was swapped for a copy. That is why API and integration users were unaffected, and only website users who signed during the window were at risk.

Across is an intent-based bridge, moving tokens through solver liquidity rather than the lock-and-mint pattern. Our explainer on how a cross-chain bridge works covers the designs and why bridges attract attackers. The irony: none of those mechanics failed. The bridge worked. The website lied.

Domain hijack (Across, Nov 10) Smart contract exploit
Attacker controls The domain record at the registrar A flaw in the protocol's code
What breaks The website visitors see The protocol's own logic
Who is at risk Only website users who signed during the window Often everyone with funds in the protocol
How you spot it The URL looks right. Only the signature request is wrong. Unusual on-chain activity, protocol pauses, team alerts
What fixes it Regaining the domain, revoking approvals Patching the code, sometimes migrating funds

It was not isolated: on October 30 and 31, a DNS hijack wave hit about a dozen DeFi sites registered with Name.com, and Namecheap saw a similar incident in June 2022, ForkLog reported.

How the Fake Site Drained Wallets

The fake app did not ask for your seed phrase. It asked for permission to move your tokens, the same permission every legitimate app asks for: you approve a contract to spend a token, and the token contract records that allowance. An approval granted to a malicious contract is just as valid on-chain as one granted to a legitimate app.

The fake across.to ran a rented wallet drainer kit. Per Bitquery, the kit checked each chain where a wallet held funds and asked for approvals on each in turn, draining one victim on two chains in the same minute. Visitors could be asked to sign direct approvals, EIP-2612 permits, or Permit2 authorizations, GoPlus said. A permit is especially dangerous: an off-chain signature that costs no gas and looks like a harmless "sign this message" request, but whoever holds it can submit it later and activate the allowance. Our guide on how wallet drainers work and how to check and revoke token approvals walks through each signature type and the revocation process step by step.

Every theft split the same way: 80% to the thief, 20% to the kit seller's fee wallet, identical down to the smallest unit. That fixed split is how Bitquery tied each drain to this attack. The fee wallet had taken a cut from about 290 drained wallets since September 25; the thief's wallet was active only while the fake site was up.

One victim accounted for most of the damage. An Aave depositor who signed a permit lost 148.60 aWETH, the token Aave issues for deposited ether, worth $304,514 by Bitquery's count. The thief pulled it out in four transactions over about three minutes from 20:09:23 UTC, each split 80/20. The owner cancelled the approval a minute after the last pull, too late: the thief had already swapped most of it for ether through UniswapX, Bitquery says. The first pull is visible on Etherscan: 115.23 and 28.81 aEthWETH to two addresses in Across's recovery guide. A second wallet lost about $55,200, most of it 26.38 ETH taken by a second route Bitquery calls the ether sweep. Six more wallets lost about $4,700 to $9,000 each, mostly USDC, and one Base wallet lost only a token with no market price.

The thief then cashed out in under four hours: about $100,000 into XMR1, a Monero-tracking token on Hyperliquid; about $100,000 via Chainflip and Solana to a wallet Bitquery labels as the online casino Rainbet's hot wallet; and about $96,000 via THORChain into 1.305 BTC, unspent when Bitquery last checked.

Who Was Affected and What Is Still Unknown

How much was stolen depends on who counted; Across has given no number. Bitquery's investigation, updated November 12, estimates $401,900 from nine wallets on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, and BNB Chain, up from $348,000 after a tip led investigators to the ether sweep. Bitquery calls its total a floor: the link to across.to is circumstantial, built on timing, the 80/20 split, and a thief's wallet active only during the hijack. Chains without transfer data such as HyperEVM and Avalanche are not counted, and tokens with no market price are left out.

GoPlus gave a different estimate, nearly $350,000 across six chains, adding Ink and Plasma, as reported by crypto.news and The Block. That matters because Across's recovery guide lists attacker contracts on Ink and Plasma too, and one user reported losing 7,053 USDT0 on Plasma, a report Cointelegraph relayed without independently verifying it. An early $294,000 figure was wrong, Bitquery corrected: it matched the kit's fee wallet balance, at least 57% of which predated the hijack, and it left out roughly $278,000 sent straight to the thief.

What remains unknown will mostly only be answered by the post-mortem Across promised on November 11 "in the coming days":

  • Across's own count of losses and victims. As of November 18, 2026, no loss figure, victim count, or post-mortem had appeared in public reporting checked for this article.
  • How the social engineering worked. Across has not said who at Namecheap was approached or what the attacker changed first. Namecheap had published no statement as of November 13.
  • Whether any funds were frozen or recovered. No recovery has been reported.
  • How compensation will work. No date, claim form, or funding source had been announced as of November 18.

Until then, do what Across asked on Tuesday night: check every network for the spender addresses in the recovery guide and revoke what you find.

What Across, Cloudflare, and SEAL911 Did

Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes and moved to shut the site down, but most of the containment came from outside the team. SEAL911, a volunteer security response group, got major wallets to flag across.to as phishing, so users saw a warning before connecting. Cloudflare first marked the domain at risk and then pulled its DNS records, taking the fake app offline while, by Across's account, Namecheap had still not responded. Across kept its front end and API offline until the domain could be secured.

Across then published a recovery guide listing the attacker contracts network by network. The eight contracts run the same malicious code, and the attacker may reuse the addresses elsewhere. Check these spenders against your approvals:

Network Malicious spender contract
Ethereum 0x46a2a474d4c22bf1ae4f8fa55da7a58673472be2
Ethereum 0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c
Base 0x5ff35703c22533398d5c7ce7acd32a04ac8462da
Arbitrum 0x2ff67cddd9ff45e0b47957d9d7c19b0732f9c514
Arbitrum 0x373c415ef034bb620e8d720afd2ace26bca13529
Ink (through Permit2) 0xdcd65e3a8f3b73c7e2f40dbab1fb95dbef871d6c
Plasma 0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd
BNB Chain (direct and through Permit2) 0x0c894c253c62eda066197011efd73b632dc96263

The guide also lists four addresses that received stolen funds; never send anything to them. It is linked in Sources, and Across said it may add addresses, so check the guide itself.

How to Protect Yourself: A Practical Checklist

A domain hijack defeats the usual advice, because the URL is real. Bookmarking helps against lookalike domains, not a hijacked real one. What protects you is what happens after the page loads. After a scare, confirm safety from the project's verified account before returning.

Read every signature request as if the site is lying. A bridge transfer needs an approval for the token you are moving, not an unlimited approval for other tokens or a permit on assets you never selected. If the request does not match the action you wanted, stop.

Compare the spender address. Your wallet's prompt shows which contract you are approving. Compare it with the addresses the project publishes in its documentation. An unknown spender is a reason to stop, even if the site looks perfect. This takes thirty seconds, and it is the check that would have caught this attack.

Use a wallet that shows you the outcome before you sign. Some wallets simulate the transaction and show the estimated change in your balances, plus warnings for new or suspicious contracts. That preview turns an abstract approval into a concrete statement: this will let this address move all of your aWETH. Our guide to importing MetaMask into Rabby walks through switching to a wallet with transaction simulation and pre-transaction risk checks. Take wallet phishing warnings seriously: the SEAL911 flag was the first line of defense for many users that night.

Check the device screen on a hardware wallet. If you sign with a Ledger or Trezor, the address and amount appear on the device itself, outside the browser's control. Read them there. If the device shows only an unreadable hash, known as blind signing, you are trusting the browser, which is exactly what a hijacked front end abuses. Prefer clear signing wherever your wallet supports it.

Keep a separate wallet for bridges and new apps. Use a wallet holding only what you plan to move, so an approval can only reach a small balance. Long-term holdings, Aave deposits, and staked positions belong in a wallet that never touches a new front end.

Revoke approvals you no longer use. Standard ERC-20 approvals never expire. Check yours every few weeks with Revoke.cash or the Etherscan Token Approval Checker, and cut anything unlimited, unfamiliar, or no longer needed. Revoking costs a small gas fee per chain, so start with unlimited approvals and unknown spenders.

What to Do If You Signed on Across.to on November 10

The guide covers anyone who visited across.to on November 10 and connected a wallet, approved a token, signed a message or permit, or sent a transaction. Integration and API users are not on that list. If you are in the first group, follow these steps, adapted from the guide:

  1. Type revoke.cash into the address bar yourself. Do not follow a revoke link from a DM, reply, or email: copies of the tool exist.
  2. Paste your address to look without connecting. You can search by address or ENS name first. You will need to connect the wallet to revoke anything.
  3. Check every network. Start where you used Across, then repeat on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Ink, BNB Chain, Optimism, and anywhere else you hold funds. Approvals are per chain.
  4. Search by spender. Paste each address from the table above into the Search by Spender box. A row that appears is an approval to the attacker. Sorting by Last Updated and checking anything dated November 10 also helps.
  5. Check Permit2 rows. Some victims signed a Permit2 permit, shown as a separate row with the real spender and an expiry note. A row whose spender is simply Permit2 is the normal Uniswap-style approval; revoking it also cuts any attacker allowance.
  6. Revoke each match. Every revoke is an on-chain transaction, so keep a little ETH or BNB for gas. Reload and verify the rows are gone or show zero, on every network.

One gap no tool can show: an unsubmitted permit exists only as a signature, so it appears in no list. Across's advice is to revoke what is visible and then move remaining assets to a new wallet. Moving the tokens out also works on its own, since an approval can only drain what is in the wallet. Revoking stops future theft; it does not bring back tokens already taken, and a direct transfer to the attacker leaves nothing to revoke.

For compensation, Across asked users who lost funds to send their wallet address and transaction hashes, with the contact starting from the user. Across says it will never send the first DM, never ask for a seed phrase or private key, and never ask anyone to "validate" or "sync" a wallet. Fake support accounts routinely follow incidents like this, so a message offering a refund is more likely the second attack than the compensation. No claim form or payment date had been announced as of November 18, 2026.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Across Protocol's smart contract hacked?

No. Nothing in Across's statements or Bitquery's investigation points to a flaw in its smart contracts. The attacker took control of the across.to domain through the registrar and served a fake website. The contracts kept running normally, and API and integration users were not affected.

How much money was stolen?

No confirmed total exists. Bitquery estimates $401,900 from nine wallets and calls it a floor; GoPlus estimated nearly $350,000 across six chains. Across confirmed neither. An early $294,000 figure was the drainer kit's fee wallet balance, not the amount stolen.

I visited across.to on November 10 but did not sign anything. Am I at risk?

Risk comes from signatures, not page loads. If you never connected or signed, the fake site gained no permission. If you connected a wallet, check your approvals anyway: the guide covers anyone who connected, approved, signed, or transacted that day.

I used Across through another app or a wallet integration. Was I affected?

According to Across, no. The attack hit the website domain only, and integrations and API users were not affected. If you never visited across.to itself on November 10, the fake site never had a chance to ask you for a signature.

Has Across published the post-mortem?

Not as of November 18, 2026. Across promised one on November 11 "in the coming days"; Coindaro noted on November 13 it had not appeared, and none surfaced in reporting checked through November 18.

Will victims be compensated?

Across promised all affected users will be made whole, but no claim form, payment date, or funding source had been announced as of November 18, 2026. Be wary of refund offers: Across says it will never DM you first or ask for your seed phrase.

Sources

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    Across Protocol Domain Hijack Explained: How a Namecheap Attack Drained an Estimated $402,000 Without Touching a Smart Contract | Kommunitas Blog